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Disclaimer 
This paper was prepared by an employee of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on 
his own time apart from his regular duties.  The NRC has neither approved nor disapproved of its 
content.  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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Abstract 
Section 102(2)(C) of the NEPA statute requires that significant effects to the human environment 
be documented in “a detailed statement by the responsible official” for “major Federal actions”.  
The statute itself does not plainly define what constitutes a major Federal action other than to say 
that “recommendation[s] and report[s] on proposals” qualify. 
 
This capstone paper will discuss the legislative history, case law, and practical application of 
NEPA’s “major Federal action” concept as it has been interpreted by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and Federal court litigation.  This author is particularly interested in the 
recent decision by the US Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which 
vacated the NRC’s 2010 Waste Confidence Rule.   One of the bases for vacating the rule was the 
fact that the Court considered the Waste Confidence Rule a major Federal action under NEPA. 
 
The paper will conclude with a discussion of the appropriateness, under NEPA, of deeming a 
policy decision like the Waste Confidence Rule, a major Federal action when the final Agency 
action, issuing or renewing a license, relies on a separate and distinct environmental impact 
statement (EIS). 
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I. Introduction 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
i
 was enacted by Congress in an 
attempt to stop and reverse, where possible, the worsening damage to America’s air, water, and 
biota from decades of industrial pollution beginning at the start of the industrial revolution in the 
19
th
 century.  NEPA was intended to force Federal government decision makers to stop and think 
about how proposed actions bear on the sustainability of the environment.  The courts call it 
taking a “hard look” at the proposed action to inform agency decision making.ii  Regardless of 
what one calls the process, it is intended to drive governmental behavior to reasonable and 
responsible environmental stewardship. 
NEPA is not a directive piece of legislation; rather, it is a procedural statute.  NEPA 
cannot force a Federal agency to abandon a proposed project; it can only force the agency to 
consider the impacts of the proposal on the environment.  Of course, if an agency finds itself in 
Federal court defending its process, it would be prudent for that agency to be able to 
substantively demonstrate that it carried out the “hard look”iii required by NEPA and that the 
agency had considered the information derived from the process before making the final decision 
to proceed with the proposal or not.  That substantive demonstration takes the form of a “detailed 
statement”, now known as an environmental impact statement (EIS), an environmental 
assessment (EA) or a categorical exclusion (CatX).
iv
  Without such a substantive demonstration, 
the agency is likely to be enjoined from pursuing the project, or required to readdress the aspects 
of the agency’s NEPA process the court found lacking.v  
Additionally, NEPA served as the gateway to a plethora of other environmental laws (or 
amendments to existing laws) such as CERCLA, RCRA, TSCA, CAA, and CWA.
vi
  These 
statutes have the legal “teeth” necessary to force individual, corporate, and governmental 
compliance with their provisions as well as hold actors accountable, civilly and criminally, for 
their actions.
vii
 
The question of whether NEPA – and its follow-on statutory daughters – has worked to 
improve America’s environment is debatable and outside the scope of this paper.  Suffice it to 
say that there are those that believe, at a minimum, the environment is cleaner and healthier than 
it was in 1969.  Others might even say that today’s American environment is cleaner and 
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healthier than it has been since the beginning of the industrial revolution.
viii
  NEPA has played a 
part in this success and therefore, viewed in that light, NEPA is an unqualified success. 
This paper will focus on how an agency decision maker determines which proposals 
require the “hard look” necessary under NEPA.  On its face, the test is simple – “major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment….”ix  In practicality, 
defining what constitutes a “major Federal action” is far from simple or straightforward. 
   
II. Context of a Major Federal Action under NEPA 
The primary driver for triggering a NEPA analysis is the undertaking, by the Federal 
government, of a major Federal action.  As stated in the introduction, determining what 
constitutes a major Federal action was somewhat unclear in the beginning days of NEPA 
practice.  There has been litigation on the issue with the primary question coming down to – as it 
often does in legal interpretation – defining the concept of “major Federal action” by looking at 
the different aspects of the definition.  This is sort of like “integration by parts” in mathematics.  
One takes a complex expression, breaks it down into smaller parts, applies a resolution method 
to each of the parts individually, and then adds those individual resolutions together to arrive at a 
comprehensive result.  In the case of a major Federal action, the NEPA practitioner – usually 
some Federal agency or its contractor – will determine whether or not the contemplated action 
constitutes a major Federal action for NEPA purposes.  Then, if that action is deemed to be a 
major Federal action, determining what level of scrutiny – categorical exclusion, environmental 
analysis, or environmental impact statement – is required. 
Title II of NEPA establishes the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the 
Executive Office of the President.
x
  CEQ is charged with a number of statutory responsibilities 
related to the effective implementation and compliance with NEPA by executive branch Federal 
agencies.  CEQ rules are set out in Title 40 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR) 
Parts 1500 to 1508.
xi
  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is an independent 
agency established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended.
xii
  The NRC has 
promulgated administrative rules to implement Section 102(2) of NEPA in Title 10 of the U.S. 
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 51.
xiii
  As an independent agency, the NRC is not 
bound, per se, by CEQ regulations.  However, the Commission has committed to “[e]xamine any 
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future interpretation or change to the Council’s [CEQ] NEPA regulations[.]”xiv  Further, in some 
instances, the Commission has adopted CEQ regulations, including the CEQ definition of a 
major Federal action.
xv
       
 
III. Definition of a Major Federal Action 
A “major Federal action” is defined in NEPA as an agency action that “significantly 
affect[s] the quality of the human environment.”xvi 
 
IV. Interpretation of the Definition 
The term “major Federal action”, in its simplest structure, is comprised of three 
subordinate terms – “major”, “Federal”, and “action” – all of which require independent 
definitions thereby adding multiplicative complexity to what might seemingly be a 
straightforward concept.  However, to get to the kernel of the concept, one must “integrate by 
parts” these varied underlying concepts to attempt to derive a working framework for identifying 
what agency actions are truly major Federal actions and then to interpret the NEPA requirement 
of preparing “a detailed statement” to that particular action.  As one might imagine, this 
definitional complexity makes for disparate conclusions between agencies on what, in any given 
circumstance, qualifies as a major Federal action under NEPA.   
a. CEQ 
CEQ has interpreted the NEPA definition of “major Federal action” to “include 
actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and 
responsibility.”xvii  CEQ appears to be defining a word – major – by using the same the word in 
the definition.  Such a practice tends to be problematic as it does not really define the term at 
hand.  CEQ attempts to resolve that circular logic through qualifying the term “major” by stating 
that “[m]ajor reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of significantly (40 CFR 
§1508.27).”xviii  The qualification of “major” seems to modify the CEQ definition to actions with 
effects that may be both major and significant.  Adding the term “significant” to the mix requires 
more clarification. 
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CEQ goes on to define “significant” both in terms of “context and intensity”.xix  CEQ 
defines “context” being “that the significance of an action must be analyzed in several contexts 
such as society as a whole …, the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality.  
Significance varies with the setting of the proposed action.”  “Intensity” is defined as “the 
severity of impact” and gives a list of considerations to be evaluated to determine intensity such 
as, among others, “beneficial and adverse” impacts, controversy of the proposed action, and 
“whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively 
significant impacts.” xx  Again, CEQ is defining “significance” using the same term in some 
evaluations like whether a cumulative impact is “insignificant” but “cumulatively significant.”  
Such “dog chasing its tail” definitional logic leaves one to conclude that the determination of 
whether an agency action is “major” or “significant” is an inherently subjective determination. 
Returning to the base definition from NEPA, one must determine whether the action 
is a Federal action.  CEQ states that actions are Federal in nature if a Federal agency “partly 
financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved” an action.xxi  Further, CEQ also deems 
“new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative 
proposals” as Federal actions.xxii  Finally, CEQ defines an action as something that falls into 
several categories including “[a]doption of official policy”,xxiii “[a]doption of formal plans”,xxiv 
“[a]doption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or 
plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a 
specific statutory program or executive directive”,xxv and “[a]pproval of specific projects, such as 
construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area” to include “actions 
approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as Federal and Federally assisted 
activities.”xxvi      
b. NRC 
The Commission has adopted the CEQ definition of a major Federal action in its 
NEPA implementing rules.
xxvii
  By doing so, the Commission has adopted the circular logic and 
subjectivity of the CEQ definition.  However, in some NRC actions, that subjectivity has been 
resolved because the Commission has dispensed with the exercise of determining whether 
certain, specific actions are major Federal actions.  In these circumstances, the Commission has 
directed that a detailed statement, or environmental impact statement (EIS), will be developed, 
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by policy, in all instances of similar agency action.  Particularly, the Commission has directed 
that an EIS will be developed for, among others, construction permits and operating licenses for 
nuclear power plants, licenses to possess and use special nuclear materials
xxviii
 for processing and 
fuel fabrication, and licenses to mill uranium or produce uranium hexafluoride.
xxix
  Additionally, 
the Commission has directed that an EIS may be developed in circumstances where a categorical 
exclusion would ordinarily suffice.
xxx
  In special cases, the NRC will prepare an EIS in response, 
for example, to a court order, as is the case with the Waste Confidence Rule resulting from the 
recent decision by U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
xxxi
 on the 
Commission’s Waste Confidence Rule.xxxii       
c. Case Law 
Subjectivity generates litigation.  Litigation requires interpretation.  Interpretation 
creates precedent that then provides a framework for future implementation and practice.  The 
subjective nature of the definition of a major Federal action has generated litigation since the 
passage of NEPA in 1969.
xxxiii
 
Several early cases took on the challenge of defining a major Federal action under 
NEPA.  Again, one needs to look at all aspects of the term – whether it is major; whether it is 
Federal; and whether it is significant. 
The NEPA statute itself defines “Federal” in very broad terms.  First, NEPA states 
that “all agencies of the Federal Government shall – [act]….”xxxiv  And, that such action, by 
Congressional authorization and direction will be “to the fullest extent possible….”xxxv  Such 
strong, all-inclusive language appears to include all Federal entities, including independent 
agencies like the NRC.
xxxvi
  The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), predecessor agency to the 
NRC, argued that NEPA did not apply to it because the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
xxxvii
 did not 
include environmental protection in the AEC’s statutory mandate.  This position was quickly put 
to bed by D.C. Circuit in the Calvert Cliffs case
xxxviii
 and later by and the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the Vermont Yankee case.
xxxix
  The Supreme Court decision established that “NEPA contains 
largely “procedural” requirements that are supplemental to existing statutory requirements of 
the federal agencies.”  (Emphasis added).xl  Inasmuch as the NRC is a Federal agency without an 
exemption, its actions – including licensing actions – are “Federal” actions under NEPA. 
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The determinations of “major” and “significant” are somewhat more complicated.  In 
fact, the early court cases were mixed on whether a “major” action was, per se, a “significant” 
one.  In the case Hanly v. Kleindienst, the court determined that the definition of the word 
“significant” as contained in NEPA was a stand-alone question of law whose legal determination 
could be made by them.
xli
  The court characterized the term “significantly” as “amorphous” and 
stated that almost every major federal action, no matter how limited in scope, has some adverse 
effect on the human environment.”xlii  The court further stated that if Congress had intended for 
all major Federal actions to require an environmental impact statement, it would not have 
qualified the language with the term “significant.”  Since neither Congress nor CEQ clearly 
defined “significant” in this context, the court reasoned that “Congress apparently was willing to 
depend principally upon the agency's good faith determination as to what conduct would be 
sufficiently serious from an ecological stand-point to require use of the full-scale procedure.”xliii  
To define “significant” this court ultimately fashioned a two-pronged threshold determination to 
ascertain whether an action was significant.  The Court stated that:   
we are persuaded that in deciding whether a major federal action will 
"significantly" affect the quality of the human environment the agency in charge, 
although vested with broad discretion, should normally be required to review the 
proposed action in the light of at least two relevant factors: (1) the extent to which 
the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by 
existing uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse 
environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that 
results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected 
area. Where conduct conforms to existing uses, its adverse consequences will 
usually be less significant than when it represents a radical change.
xliv
 
Finally, the court reasoned that “it must be recognized that even a slight increase in adverse 
conditions that form an existing environmental milieu may sometimes threaten harm that is 
significant. One more factory polluting air and water in an area zoned for industrial use may 
represent the straw that breaks the back of the environmental camel. Hence the absolute, as well 
as comparative, effects of a major federal action must be considered.”xlv  In short, the court 
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added that “before a preliminary or threshold determination of significance is made the 
responsible agency must give notice to the public of the proposed major federal action and an 
opportunity to submit relevant facts which might bear upon the agency's threshold decision.”xlvi  
These so-called “threshold determinations” are difficult to establish and courts have ruled in 
contradictory manners (as indicated by the dissent in Kleindienst).  Some agencies, including the 
NRC,
xlvii
 have resolved this challenge by simply making “the distinction [of significance] a 
programmatic one; that is, all actions under certain programs require environmental impact 
statements, and all actions under other programs do not.” (Emphasis in the original).xlviii 
d. Other Thoughts 
As stated earlier, some agencies, including the NRC have resolved the “major” versus 
“significant” debate by deeming all actions of certain nature subject to preparation of an 
environmental impact statement.  By doing this, the agency no longer needs to quibble over 
whether proposed action A needs an EIS and then later defend why proposed action A was 
deemed EIS-worthy when a similar proposed action B was not; or split hairs over why proposed 
action A was “significant” when proposed action B was not even though both were major 
Federal actions. 
In 10 CFR 51.20(b), the Commission has stated that “[t]he following types of actions 
require an environmental impact statement or a supplement to an environmental impact 
statement: 
(1) Issuance of a limited work authorization or a permit to construct a nuclear power 
reactor, testing facility, or fuel reprocessing plant under part 50 of this chapter, or 
issuance of an early site permit under part 52 of this chapter. 
(2) Issuance or renewal of a full power or design capacity license to operate a nuclear 
power reactor, testing facility, or fuel reprocessing plant under part 50 of this chapter, or 
a combined license under part 52 of this chapter. 
(3) Issuance of a permit to construct or a design capacity license to operate or renewal of 
a design capacity license to operate an isotopic enrichment plant pursuant to part 50 of 
this chapter. 
(4) Conversion of a provisional operating license for a nuclear power reactor, testing 
facility or fuel reprocessing plant to a full term or design capacity license pursuant to part 
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50 of this chapter if a final environmental impact statement covering full term or design 
capacity operation has not been previously prepared.” 
These actions require an environmental impact statement because, in its discretion, the 
Commission believes that they are both major actions and significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment.  This process, presumably, conserves resources by ensuring a predictable 
and stable process for both the agency and the applicant.  When all parties know that an EIS will 
be required for certain actions – like licensing a nuclear power plant – those parties can plan 
accordingly.  An additional benefit to the NRC is that, by deeming all nuclear power plant 
applications EIS-worthy, whether under 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 52, the agency can 
require applicants to submit an “environmental report” as a part of the application.  CEQ 
regulations permit such practices so long as the agency conducts an independent evaluation of 
the information submitted.
xlix
  The Commission defines an “environmental report” as “a 
document submitted to the Commission by an applicant for a permit, license, or other form of 
permission, or an amendment to or renewal of a permit, license or other form of permission, or 
by a petitioner for rulemaking, in order to aid the Commission in complying with section 102(2) 
of NEPA.”l  All nuclear power plant applicants are required to submit an environmental report as 
part of their applications.
li
 
 
V. Why licensing actions are considered Major Federal Actions 
Many Federal agencies actually build things.  The Department of Defense builds military 
bases and ships and airplanes; the National Park Service builds infrastructure for the Nation’s 
parks; the Federal Aviation Administration builds control towers; the Bureau of Reclamation 
builds dams.  Other Federal agencies, like the NRC, build nothing.  They license others to build 
things.  Yet, these agencies that are merely licensing and not actually building are still subject to 
the EIS requirements of NEPA because those licensing actions may be considered major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.  But wait – it’s a piece of 
paper – a license.  Is the NRC, for example, really undertaking a major Federal action by issuing 
a license?  CEQ thinks so – and the courts have validated their position. 
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CEQ regulations appear to have connected the dots between licensing and a major 
Federal action thusly: licensing creates effects and are thereby major Federal actions.  40 CFR 
§1508.18 states that a “’[m]ajor Federal Action’ includes actions with effects that may be major 
and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.”  (Emphasis added).  40 
CFR §1508.18(b)(4) further clarifies by stating that “[a]pproval of specific projects, such 
construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area.  Projects include 
actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as Federal and Federally 
assisted activities.”  (Emphasis added).  The NRC has specifically adopted this definition of a 
major Federal action.
lii
  Hence, merely licensing a project may give rise to that project being a 
major Federal action even the Federal agency never turns a single shovelful of dirt. 
The case law on this concept is extensive starting with the 1971 Calvert Cliffs case.  In 
that case the D.C. Circuit, throughout its opinion, accepted as a given that issuance of a license 
constitutes a major Federal action.
liii
  Specifically, the Court states that: 
The procedure for environmental study and consideration set up by the Appendix 
D rules is as follows: Each applicant for an initial construction permit must 
submit to the Commission his own "environmental report,” presenting his 
assessment of the environmental impact of the planned facility and possible 
alternatives which would alter the impact.  When construction is completed and 
the applicant applies for a license to operate the new facility, he must again 
submit an "environmental report" noting any factors which have changed since 
the original report.  At each stage, the Commission's regulatory staff must take the 
applicant's report and prepare its own "detailed statement" of environmental costs, 
benefits and alternatives.  The statement will then be circulated to other interested 
and responsible agencies and made available to the public.  After comments are 
received from those sources, the staff must prepare a final "detailed 
statement" and make a final recommendation on the application for a 
construction permit or operating license.
liv
 
(Emphasis added).  The Court in this case accepted the Atomic Energy Commission’s rule 
requiring a “detailed statement” – read as EIS – before a licensing decision could be made. 
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Other cases that stand for the proposition that licensing actions alone are sufficient to 
constitute a major Federal action include Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. 
Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973), (there is "Federal action" 
within the meaning of the statute not only when an agency proposes to build a facility itself, but 
also whenever an agency makes a decision which permits action by other parties which will 
affect the quality of the environment.); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 
143, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1985), ([t]he government has conceded that the approval is a "major action" 
and that it does not fall into a categorical exclusion to the EIS requirements.); and Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States E.P.A., 822 F.2d 104, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 
(unless the construction itself is pursuant to federal financial assistance, NEPA review may only 
be conducted with regard to the issuance of a discharge permit, which constitutes, of course, the 
major Federal action.). 
 
VI. Is NRC Waste Confidence Rule a Major Federal Action? 
In 1977, the Commission advanced a policy wherein it “would not continue to license 
reactors if it did not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can and will in due course be 
disposed of safely.” lv  Additionally, in Minnesota v. NRC, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit “directed the Commission to consider ‘whether there is 
reasonable assurance that an off-site storage solution [for spent fuel] will be available by … the 
expiration of the plants’ operating licenses, and if not, whether there is reasonable assurance that 
the fuel can be stored safely at the sites beyond those dates.”lvi  To implement that policy 
decision and Court directive, the Commission promulgated 10 CFR 51.23 otherwise known as 
the Waste Confidence Rule in 1984.
lvii
  Generically applicable, the rule intended to resolve the 
question of the safety and environmental impacts of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel by 
stating, as a policy matter, that the Commission believed that spent nuclear fuel could be stored 
in the facility spent fuel pool or in an onside independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) 
for up to thirty years after a plant ceased operations.  The rule further stated that Commission 
“believe[d] there [was] reasonable assurance that one or more mined geologic repositories for 
commercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel [would] be available by the year 2007-
2009.”lviii  The promulgation of this rule eliminated any consideration of post-operation spent 
Discussion of “Major Federal Actions” Under NEPA  11 
 
fuel storage from the site-specific licensing decisions and no discussion of it was required in 
“any environmental report, environmental impact statement, environmental assessment or other 
analysis prepared in connection with the issuance or amendment of an operating license for a 
nuclear reactor or in connection with the issuance of an initial license for storage of spent fuel at 
an ISFSI, and any amendment thereto.”lix  Finally, the rule specifically states that it does not alter 
any environmental review requirements during the term of the operating license or in an ISFSI 
license proceeding.  There is nothing in the Statement of Consideration for the 1984 rule that 
would indicate the Commission considered the rule to constitute a major Federal action under 
NEPA, nor was there any direction by the Court in the Minnesota case that such a rulemaking 
would constitute a major Federal action under NEPA.
lx
  Further, by operation of the 1984 Waste 
Confidence Rule, consideration of spent fuel storage was not part of the environmental analysis.  
This decision was reviewed in 1990 wherein the Commission checked the validity of its 
five findings from the 1984 rule.  At that time, the Commission revised two of the five findings 
in light of new circumstances.  Most significantly, the Commission changed their prediction of 
the availability of a mined geologic repository to “the first quarter of the twenty-first century.”lxi  
The change reflected the reality that the mined repository would most likely not be in service by 
2009 as predicted in the 1984 rule.  In doing so, the Commission believed that “[t]o specify a 
year for the expected availability of a repository decades hence would misleadingly imply a 
degree of precision now unattainable.” lxii  The Commission also, in this update, extended the 
periodic review of the Waste Confidence Decision from every five years to every ten years.  
 
 
Finally, in 2010, the Commission again revised the Decision and stated that, given the apparent 
demise of Yucca Mountain, that a repository would be available “when necessary” instead of 
setting a specific time window.
lxiii
   
The Commission’s Waste Confidence Decision raises the question whether a mere 
opinion – the prognostication of the Commission as to when a geologic SNF repository would be 
built – constitutes a major Federal action under NEPA.  Given the lack of “detailed statements” 
supporting this prognostication in 1984, 1990, and 2010, it appears that the Commission did not 
consider the “Decision” a major Federal action.  Moreover, the absence of such a discussion in 
1979 in Minnesota seems to have set such a tone.  Additionally, this question is exacerbated by 
the fact that no licensing actions would proceed solely based on the Waste Confidence Decision.  
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The Waste Confidence Decision was a consequence of the Court’s direction in Minnesota, not a 
pre-determined step in nuclear reactor power plant licensing.  The D.C Circuit in New York v. 
NRC addressed this issue in 2012.
lxiv
 
 
VII. Case Study: New York v. NRC 
The Commission had stated that they would revisit the Waste Confidence rule 
periodically and did so in 2010.  The 2010 update modified two of the five findings – the 
timeline for rollout of a National geologic repository and the length of time that spent fuel could 
be stored onsite after the cessation of plant operations.  The Department of Energy had, that same 
year, attempted to withdraw its application to license the Yucca Mountain repository.
lxv
  By 
revising the prognostication of when a geologic repository would be available, it seems that the 
Commission “was no doubt influenced by the recent shelving of the Yucca Mountain 
proposal”lxvi when it changed the language of the Waste Confidence Decision repository 
availability from the first quarter of the twenty-first century to that of “when necessary.”  This 
change of position, as well as the revised finding that spent nuclear fuel could be stored onsite 
for up to sixty years after cessation of plant operations, caused a lawsuit to break out challenging 
the 2010 revision.  The State of New York and the Prairie Island Indian Community were the 
Petitioners and a number of other parties participated as intervenors.
lxvii
 
There were a number of issues argued in New York v. NRC but this paper is limited to 
only one of the bases for vacating the rule – the fact that the Court considered the Waste 
Confidence Rule a major Federal action under NEPA.
lxviii
   
In short, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated 
the Commission’s 2010 Waste Confidence Decision update and the Temporary Storage Rule and 
remanded it to the Commission “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”lxix  
 
VIII. Discussion of the Ruling 
The first issue the Court took up was whether the Waste Confidence Decision constituted 
a major Federal action under NEPA.  Notwithstanding the three decades of Commission 
precedent wherein waste confidence decisions were not considered major Federal actions, the 
Court ruled that this one was.  The opinion states that “[the Court has] long held that NEPA 
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requires that ‘environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the decision making 
process concerning a particular action.’”lxx  The Court stated that, because the “WCD makes 
generic findings that have a preclusive effects in all future licensing decisions – it is a pre-
determined ‘stage’ of each licensing decision[,]”lxxi and thus a major Federal action. 
 The Court continued by citing CEQ regulation 40 CFR 1508.18, discussed earlier in this 
paper, that defines a major Federal action as one having “indirect effects, which are caused by 
the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably 
foreseeable.”  Again, the Commission has adopted the CEQ definition of a major Federal action 
from 40 CFR 1508.18.  The Court states that “[i]t is not only reasonably foreseeable but 
eminently clear that the WCD will be used to enable licensing decisions based on its 
findings.”lxxii  Additionally, the Court quotes Andrus v. Sierra Club that states, “CEQ’s NEPA 
interpretations are entitled to substantial deference.”lxxiii  Finally, the Court states that, given the 
language of the Commission’s rules at 10 C.F.R 51.23(b), the WCD “renders uncontestable 
general conclusions about the environmental effects of general plant licensure that will apply in 
every licensing decision.”lxxiv  The Court reasoned that, since these general conclusions cannot be 
contested during licensing, the WCD is a “pre-determined ‘stage’ of each licensing decision” and 
thus a major Federal action requiring an environmental impact statement, or an environmental 
assessment with an attendant finding of no significant impact.   
 The Court’s rationale for deeming the Waste Confidence Decision a major Federal 
action are based on the fact that the “general conclusions [from the Waste Confidence Decision] 
about the environmental effects of general plant licensure” are not contestable in the subsequent 
licensing decision.  Presumably, that rationale is because the Commission does not allow 
challenges to its regulations in licensing proceedings.
lxxv
  However, there are several ways, under 
Commission practice, in which those conclusions are contestable – through public comment 
during initial rulemaking,
lxxvi
 by administrative litigation during license hearings when “new and 
significant” information emerges,lxxvii and by petitions for rulemaking.lxxviii 
The NRC’s rulemaking processes allow for public comment, usually for 75 to 90 days, 
during which comments are accepted for consideration.
lxxix
  The NRC staff reviews and analyzes 
these comments and, when persuaded, revises the rule to reflect the substance of the comment.  
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Secondly, during licensing proceedings – those same proceedings where the Waste Confidence 
Decision is operative – putative intervenors may “make their case” to the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board or to the Commission as appropriate.  If the petitioners are able to meet the 
admissibility standards of 10 CFR 2.309(f), they may be admitted as parties to the licensing 
proceeding wherein they may have an opportunity to challenge WCD conclusions on the basis of 
emergent “new and significant” informationlxxx if they are able to show “special circumstances” 
under 10 CFR § 2.335(b).
lxxxi
  Finally, anyone can petition the Commission at any time to engage 
in rulemaking under 10 CFR § 2.802.
lxxxii
  This mechanism could be used to challenge or revise 
the language or conclusions of the Waste Confidence rule with persuasive justification.  
Certainly, these three mechanisms to address alleged deficiencies with the Waste Confidence 
Decision are not easy nor are they straightforward.  However, they are no more burdensome than 
the contemporaneous challenge during licensing that, the DC Circuit implies would be necessary 
for the Waste Confidence Decision to cease to be a “pre-determined stage” of licensing.  
Reliance on these three administrative processes for challenge to alleged WCD defects would 
have preserved the Commission’s decades-long precedent that WCD, standing alone, is not a 
major Federal action.  In any event, the Commission did not appeal the 2012 New York v. NRC 
decision and, therefore, development of an EIS to support a replacement rule to the vacated 2010 
WCD update is now underway.  As of this writing, the NRC staff has issued a draft WCD EIS. 
IX. Conclusion 
The concept of a major Federal action under NEPA is not as straightforward or intuitive 
as it may appear by simply reading NEPA.  When one delves into the elements of the term, one 
quickly realizes that the terms “major” and “significant” muddy the definitional waters greatly.  
As seen by the discussion above and by the references list below, there have literally been entire 
books written on this seemingly simple term.  Add to that all the case law that has arisen over the 
past four decades and one sees that ascertaining whether a specific action qualifies as a major 
Federal action is many times a subjective inquiry dependent on broad interpretation and 
differences of opinion. 
With regard to NRC licensing actions, NEPA itself, the Courts, and regulations 
promulgated by CEQ and the Commission, have by decree, removed the guesswork from the 
inquiry.  There is no “integration by parts” for the NRC NEPA practitioner to determine whether 
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one has a major Federal action at hand.  Once merely needs to look at NEPA Section 102(2)(C), 
Minnesota v NRC, New York v. NRC (2009), New York v. NRC (2012), 40 CFR 1508.18 (CEQ), 
and 10 CFR 51.20(b) (NRC).  Perhaps calculating reactor power densities would be easier.        
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